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CASE COMMENTS
Criminal Law -

Right to Counsel at Revocation
of Probation

In 1963 Hoyt Riffle pleaded guilty to a charge of breaking and
entering and was sentenced to a term of one to ten years in the
state penitentiary. His sentence was immediately suspended and
he was plyaced on probation for five years. In 1965 Riffle's probation was revoked at a hearing at which he was not represented
by counsel. Riffle applied to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in 1969 for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was
deprived of substantial constitutional rights because he was not
afforded the assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. Held, prisoner remanded. Revocation of probation, where
sentencing of the prisoner is not involved, is not a stage of criminal
proceedings that entitles the prisoner to the assistance of counsel.
State ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, 168 S.E.2d 810 (W.Va. 1969).
In Mempa v. Rhay,' which originated in the state of Washington, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a felony. The
trial judge withheld sentencing of the defendant and placed him on
probation. Thereafter, the defendant's probation was revoked at
a hearing at which he was not represented by counsel, and he was
then sentenced to the maximum term provided by law for that
offense.: The Washington court denied the petitioner's prayer to be
released from prison in a habeas corpus proceeding, but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment. In
reversing the Washington decision, the Supreme Court was concerned with the application of the rule requiring counsel to be
provided for an indigent at every stage of a criminal proceeding
3
where substantial rights of an accused may be affected.
389 U.s. 128 (1967).
'Although the trial judge was required to impose the maximum sentence
provided by law, the statute further provided that the judge should recommend
the length of time he believed the prisoner should serve before being paroled.
Mempa v. Rhay, 889 U.S. 128 (1967).
' In Townsend v. Burke, 834 U.S. 736 (1948), the defendant pleaded guilty
to burglary and robbery in Pennsylvania and was not represented by counsel.
While the judge was considering the sentence, the defendant was prejudiced by
submission of misinformation regarding his prior criminal record. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant was denied due process of law. Counsel might not
have changed the sentence but would have taken steps to see that the conviction
and sentence was not predicated on misinformation or misreading of the court
records.
1
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The decision in Mempa can be interpreted in two different
ways. The first interpretation views Mempa in its narrow concern
that substantial rights of the defendant were affected because a
sentencing process was involved at the hearing. This view is
technically correct because it limits the decision of Mempa to cases
with similar facts. The proponents of this view argue that counsel
should be provided an indigent defendant in a probation revoca4
tion hearing only if sentencing is involved.
The second interpretation tries to derive from Mempa the
broadest meaning and significance of the statements concerning
the substantial rights of a criminal accused. This view looks not
only to the particular facts in Mempa but also tries to encompass
the perceived significance of the fourteenth amendment as construed by the United States Supreme Court in previous decisions.
This broader interpretation views the "substantial rights" rule used
in Mempa as being applicable in any proceeding where a defendant's
liberty may be at stake, and does not limit the applicability of the
rule to only those critical stages already identified by the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. The proponents of this interpretation contend that probation revocation is such a critical stage

The defendant in Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), pleaded guility to
murder without the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant did not intelligently waive his right to counsel because there were
certain technical defenses of which he was unaware.
In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), the Alabama law required the
assistance of counsel at arraignments because only then could a defendant
raise the defense of insanity. The defendant was arraigned in the absence of
counsel and later convicted of a capital offense. The Court decided that the
absence of counsel violated the defendant's rights under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the decisions in Townsend, Moore, and Hamilton would seem to
provide a defendant with adequate protection, the right to counsel was limited
to special circumstances by the prior decision of Betts v. Brady, 316 UjS. 455
(1942), in which the Supreme Court held that providing counsel for an indigent
defendant is not a fundamental right but a legislative policy. In 1963, the
Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruled the
Betts decision and stated that the right to counsel in a criminal trial is a
fundamental right that is essential to a fair trial. Gideon did not enumerate the
various stages in a criminal proceeding at which counsel is required. However,
Townsend, Moore and Hamilton, with the Betts requirement of special circumstances stripped away by Gideon, clearly stand for the proposition that providing
counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding
where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.
4See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bishop v. Brierly, 288 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa.
1968); State v. Hartsell, 277 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 Uj1. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.. 52 (1961); Townsenjd V. Buhrke, 334 US. 736 (1948).
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of criminal proceedings that substantial fights of the accused are
affected whether or not sentencing is involved at the hearing."
After the Mempx decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court
granted habeas corpus relief in three cases where a prisoners' probation had been revoked and each had been sentenced at a hearing without the assistance of counsel. In one case our court said
"[t]he reasoning of the court in the Mempa and Walkling s cases
indicates dearly that the criminal defendant is entitled to the
assissance of counsel at any proceeding at which his probation is
revoked."O This statement was attacked by Judge Berry who felt
that the decision in Mempa was not broad enough to include a
situation where sentencing was not involved. 10
In other decisions since Mempa, where sentencing was not
involved in probation revocation hearings, the majority of the
cases have distinguished the facts from those in Mempa and adopted
the narrower view as expressed by Judge Berry." Theses courts
have argued that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel does not apply to a hearing on a motion to revoke probation
except to extent the revocation involved the deferred sentencing procedure present in Mempa. 2 Where the prisoner was
not sentenced at a probation revocation the fight to counsel has
been held inapplicable.3 This view was developed by interpreting
Mempa to apply only to cases involving sentencing and seems to
disregard the "substantial rights" rule as reiterated in Mempa.
A few courts have taken a contrary view of the problem and
adopted a broader policy concerning the fight to counsel at a probation revocation hearing. These courts have not differentiated
between a hearing where a prisoner was sentenced and one where he

'See, e.g., Garigan v. State 217 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1967); Perry v. Williard, 247
Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967).
'State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 165 S.E.2d 90 (W. Va. 1968); State ex rel.
Render v. Wood, 165 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1968); State ex rel. Phillips v. Wood,
165 S.E.2d 105 (W Va. 1968).
'Walking was one of the parties in a case that was consolidated for argument in Mempa v. Rhay.
' State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 165 s9E.2d 90, 96 (W. Va. 1969)
(emphasis added).
" State ex tel. Strickland v. Melton, 165 S.E.2d 90, 101 (W. Va. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
'See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bishop v. Brierly, 288 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
" Id.
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was not sentenced. The Oregon Supreme Court held that an indigent

defendant is entitled to counsel under the equal protection and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution at any
hearing where the defendant's probation is revoked. 14 The court
felt that the decision to deprive a probationer of his freedom is as
critical as the imposition of sentence and that no magical difference exists between sentencing and probation revocation.
The Riffle decision was based on the distinction between the
right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing involving sentencing and a hearing where sentencing was not involved. However, Judge Haymond in a dissenting opinion in Riffle, felt that
there was more to the case than a distinction of Mempa. He pointed
out that the decision in Strickland v. Meltona created precedent in
West Virginia to the effect that counsel must be provided at any
proceeding at which a criminal defendant's probation is revoked.
He dismissed as erroneous the majority decision that the opinion
expressed in Strickland was clearly obiter dictum.10
Judge Caplan, also dissenting, pointed out that probation
cannot be revoked without a hearing in West Virginia due to the
statute which requires a hearing on the issue of probation revocation.1 7 He inferred that the legislative purpose in affording the
defendant a hearing would be meaningless if it were not contemplated that he would be given an opportunity to defend himself.
Since it has been held that denial of such a hearing would
deprive the accused of the equal protection of state law", Judge
State v. Hartsell, 277 F. Supp. 993 (E. D. Tenn. 1967).
Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967).

1516. S.E. 2d 90 (W. Va. 1968).

nState ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, 168 S.Ei2d 810, 817 (W. Va. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
"State ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, 168 S:E.2d 810, 815 (W. Va. 1969) (dissenting opinion). The statute Judge Caplan referred to provides:
If at any time during the period of probation there shall be reasonable
cause to believe that the probationer has violated any off the conditions
of his probation, the probation officer may arrest him . . . whereupon he
shall be brought before the court ... for a prompt and summary hearing.
•.. W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 12, § 10 (Michie 1966).
;s Hamrick v. Boles, 231 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. W. Va. 1964). In this case the
defendant's probation was revoked without a hearing. The court found that the
defendant was deprived of important rights by discriminatory state action and
could therefore claim protection under the equal protection clause. The court
added that although the equal protection clause has its principal application
in discrimination as to class or race, its reach is not limited and could therefore
be applied in other kinds of cases. The court found prohibited discrinination
in this case because the judge that revoked the probationknowingly and intentionally denied the defendant a hearing.
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Caplan felt that such a hearing should be like any other criminal
proceeding and the defendant should be entitled to the assistance
of counsel.
Both dissenting opinions reached the conclusion that a defendant has substantial rights that would be affected in a probation revocation hearing. According to the Mempa decision where
such substantial rights may be affected at a criminal proceeding,
counsel must be afforded the indigent defendant. It seems that the
majority decisions have drawn a fine distinction center around
whether a prisoner was sentenced when his probation was revoked
rather than granting a broad constitutional right to counsel in every
situation where a defendant's liberty is in jeopardy.
The West Virginia Supreme Court may have made a proper
technical distinction between Riffle and Mempa. In West Virginia,
however, as well as in other jurisdictions, the option to revoke the
probation remains with the hearing judge. Thus, although the
judge may be more restricted in his power to impose a criminal
penalty than in the sentencing procedure, he still controls the defendant's liberty. Because of this, at such a critical proceeding,
there are strong considerations favoring the position that the
defendant should be afforded counsel.
Steven C. Hanley

Deeds

-

Estoppel By Deed -

Void Deeds Not

Given Effect by Estoppel
On April 1, 1947, Gold conveyed real estate to Eveline Foulds
Holwell by a deed which used only the grantee's maiden name. On
the same day Eveline Foulds Holwell conveyed the same tract
back to Gold, but in the deed immediately following Foulds' name
were the words "a single woman." The next day Foulds recorded
her deed from Gold, but the deed of reconveyance to Gold was
left unrecorded until 1958. In 1956 Foulds executed a deed of conveyance of the same land to a Florida corporation which soon after
recorded that deed. Again the marital status of Eveline Foulds
was not stated. In 1959 Gold and the corporation conveyed the
same tract of land by separate deeds to the defendant Zofnas. In
1969 plaintiff Eveline Fouls Holwell and her husband of fifty-six

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970

5

